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INTRODUCTION

The failure of Lehman Brothers is now old news, although it will be
a considerable time before the underlying legal issues are fully
unravelled. The scale of the task involved in unwinding its affairs is
unprecedented. This insolvency is by far the largest insolvency in
history: in pure financial terms, Lehman Brothers is estimated to be more
than six times the size of Worldcom, which was previously considered
the largest corporate insolvency ever.
This article uses the factual and legal background of this complex
liquidation as the focus for an examination of the role of public policy in
these testing situations, and also for a more general assessment of the
legitimate limits to the use of public policy arguments by courts wishing
to preserve the reputation of the UK's commercial laws as "fit for
purpose" in the current global economy.
In the Lehman Brothers' insolvency litigation to date, at least in the
UK (and this article restricts itself to the UK jurisdiction), some public
policy inputs have passed without comment while others have attracted a
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great deal of debate. There appears to be no middle ground. Where
there has been debate, its ferocity is perhaps unexpected: the rules in play
are not new; they are tried and tested national insolvency rules. However
the scale of this liquidation makes a difference. It ensures that the legal
arguments in play are important not only for the immediate practical task
of administering the estate, but also for the future reputation and
international competitiveness of the UK's national insolvency regime.
Public policy arises in different guises. It clearly has a role to play
in the formulation of national statutory insolvency rules. It is also
evident in the historical development of all the common law and
statutory property rules which play such a crucial role in insolvency
outcomes. And, finally, it is the explicit justification for an insolvencyspecific overarching common law rule-the anti-deprivation rule-that
effectively puts a higher public value on collective management of the
insolvent's estate than on freedom of contract and party autonomy, at
least once the debtor is insolvent. Each of these arenas for public policy
engagement is discussed here. The degree of controversy surrounding
each is quite different. Broadly speaking, it is accepted that parliament
has a right to legislate, even if its efforts attract strong criticism. Judicial
lawmaking is seen as quite another matter, however. There is, it seems, a
fine and not universally agreed line between the proper adjudication of
novel issues and the improper assumption of power to engage in judicial
lawmaking. This article describes the role of public policy in each of
these various arenas, concentrating on the more controversial end-the
limits of judicial intervention on the grounds of public policy.
STATUTORY RULES AND PUBLIC POLICY

Every statute reflects a particular public policy stance. The UK's
statutory insolvency rules are no different. Their objective is to provide
a system of rules that determines how innocent parties should be treated
when the resources of the insolvent debtor are insufficient to give
everyone what they expected. In the UK, as in most developed
economies, the baseline legal rule is pari passu-the pain will be shared
equally-with the significant exception that pari passu applies only to the
debtor's assets.
The first step in the management of any insolvency distribution,
therefore, is to remove from the insolvency pool all those assets that are
subject to proprietary claims by third parties. The consequence of this
rule-at least as we are commonly minded to think of it-is that
proprietary claims and personal claims are distinguished, as are the
creditors asserting them. Different countries have different criteria for
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what counts as the third parties' property; in the UK many of those rules
are common law and equitable rules. These are considered later.
The second step is to distribute what remains according to the rules
set out in the relevant insolvency legislation. Again, different countries
have different national policies in respect of the insolvency distributions
of the pool that is left.
Parliament has varied these two basic principles only slightly. A
summary here does injustice to the detailed rules, but serves to highlight
First, parliament has
the public policy considerations in play.
in two respects: in
claimants
constrained the privileges of proprietary
certain circumstances the proprietary status of claims will not be
recognised unless the claim is "perfected" by registration, or public
notice is given to those who may be adversely affected by the proprietary
claim.' Secondly, some proprietary interests, even if registered, will not
accrue solely for the benefit of the interest holder, but the benefits
associated with them will be shared, according to different legislative
formulae, either with certain nominated preferred personal claimants,2 or
even with the ordinary general unsecured creditors. In short, parliament
has seen the wisdom of ameliorating the impact of proprietary attributes,
so that holders of proprietary interests have their rights qualified in
certain respects if the defendant is insolvent. Put another way, the
orthodox doctrinal attributes of proprietary interests are forced to give
way in the face of the compelling policy concerns that arise in
insolvency.
Secondly, even in dealing with the personal claimants, parliament
has seen fit to vary slightly the pari passu-"equality is equity"distribution rules. Personal claimants are categorised as "preferred,"
"ordinary" and "deferred" creditors.4 The pool of assets available to pay
personal claimants is used first to pay all the preferred creditors, in full if
possible, but otherwise pari passu. If there are funds remaining, then the
ordinary creditors are paid, again in full if possible but otherwise pari
passu. If there is anything left (and there rarely is), then the deferred
creditors share pari passu.
These rules are well known, and the point here is not to describe yet
again their familiar details, but to reiterate the idea that insolvency law is
1. For example, the requirement to register certain charges. These registration
requirements only apply to legal securities (and, within that class, only mortgages and
charges, not common law liens and pledges, where the protection is delivered by
registration is not seen as necessary since the security holder has possession of the
secured asset.) These registration rules do not apply to practical security devices, such as
retention of title clauses and Quistclose trusts. Companies Act, 2006, §§ 860, 861.
2. Insolvency Act, 1986, §§ 40, 175(2)(b).
3. Id. § 176A.
4. Id. §§ 115, 156, 175, 189, 178, 74 and Schedule 6.
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largely a matter of policy. In the contest between innocent parties, and
the difficult determination of who will win and who will lose, parliament
has felt it necessary to intervene for better policy ends. Other regimes
are possible-that is obvious from an examination of the different
approaches adopted internationally. Indeed, other priorities might well
be fairer,s but parliament has set out the rules for the time being, and they
determine the allocation of losses between innocent parties to the
debtor's insolvency.
Quite predictably, this particular public policy element is never
questioned in court. There would be no point. The task facing the court
is to apply the existing law, not determine what improvements
parliament might have made.
PROPERTY RULES AND PUBLIC POLICY
Before these accepted statutory insolvency distribution rules can be
applied, there is a preliminary step. Creditors can only be paid out of the
debtor's assets; assets belonging to third parties must be returned to them
before the pool is disbursed. In the Lehman Brothers' liquidation, this
first task-determining which assets comprise the insolvent's own estate,
and which assets need to be excluded as legitimately the subject of
proprietary claims of others-has proved the most complex. The
complexity is exaggerated by the sheer scale of the operation: for
example, the balance sheet for Lehman Brothers International (Europe)
("LBIE") on November 30, 2007, showed debts in excess of $400
billion. But the issues themselves are also complicated: by 2007, the
global financial markets had developed a range of tools that had received
limited testing in the marketplace and even less testing in the courts.
The rules for determining which creditors have proprietary rights
are, by and large, common law and equitable rules, and the arena for
debate over the proper framing of these rules-including public policy
debate-seems far broader. But even a superficial examination of the
cases shows that this debate is usually confined to issues of doctrine and
precedent; it is rarely about principle, and never about public policy.
Perhaps Lord Millett's comments in Foskett v McKeown say it all:6
Property rights are determined by fixed rules and settled principles.
They are not discretionary. They do not depend upon ideas of what is
5. See Sarah Worthington, ProprietaryRemedies and Insolvency Policy: The Need

for a New Approach, in COMMERCIAL LAW: PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICE 191-205
(Lowry, John and Mistelis, Loukas eds., Lexis-Nexis/Butterworths 2006); see Vanessa
Finch & Sarah Worthington, The Pari Passu Principle and Ranking Restitutionary
Rights, in INSOLVENCY AND RESTITUTION 1-20 (Francis Rose ed., Mansfield Press 2000).
6. Foskett v. McKeown, (2001) 1 A.C. 102, 126-127 (Lord Millett).
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"fair, just and reasonable." Such concepts, which in reality mask
decisions of legal policy, have no place in the law of property.
Any number of examples might be chosen to illustrate the absence
of public policy argument in these cases. The options open to creditors
intent on proving they have a proprietary interest in the debtor's assets
are limited: the interest can only be by way of ownership (at law, or in
equity via a trust) or security (pledge, legal or equitable mortgage, or
charge). Just because the options are limited does not mean that the
issues are simple, however. Recall the long run of cases seeking proper
interpretation of retention-of-title clauses, or adjudication on the valid
creation of trusts, or assessment of whether an arrangement creates a
security interest and what form that takes. In all these assessments the
contract between the parties is crucial, not the label they use to describe
it. Proper characterisation of the agreed rights and obligations is a matter
of law, and it is this doctrinal analysis which provides the answer to the
creditor's question, "Do I have a proprietary interest?" Public policy
does not emerge, or at least not explicitly.7
This can be seen clearly in Lehman Brothers' litigation about "client
money" and "client assets" in relation to test cases from amongst the
thousands of prime brokerage agreements needing to be unwound.8 In
the face of Lehman Brothers' insolvency, the clients' best argument was
that these assets-the client money or client assets (generally
securities)-were held by Lehman Brothers or its intermediary on trust
for the clients. Assessing the merits of such a claim can be complicated
in any event, but it was made even more so in the Lehman Brothers'
insolvency because there are no industry standards for prime brokerage
agreements; each must be reviewed separately, and each must be read in
the light of FSA (UK Financial Services Authority) rules as set out in the
FSA's Client Assets Sourcebook ("CASS"). In many cases, the outlook
for clients is grim. These agreements are typically skewed in favour of
the prime brokers so as to assist market activity; and in any event, the
collapse of these brokers had always been assumed to be well nigh
impossible.
Consider trusts of "client money." The FSA rules look to be
protective. They create a compulsory statutory trust on receipt of the
client money, and require prime brokers to hold such money in a
segregated account with a bank or a qualifying money market fund. If a
7. It is, of course, impossible to explain the evolution of trusts and securities
without conceding some judicial public policy input, including some value judgement
about the worth of enforcing the specific contractual or even non-contractual agreements
between the parties.
8. See Sarah Worthington, Pitfalls with ProprietaryClaims: Lehman Bros Again,
24(6) BuTTERWORTHS J. INT'L BANK. & FIN. L. 321-324 (2009).
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client's fund placed with the Lehman Brothers intermediary is "Client
Money" (as defined under the FSA Client Money Rules), and if it can
still be identified (either as a segregated pool or by tracing into nonsegregated Lehman Brothers' accounts), then the monies are prima facie
trust funds and are excluded from the insolvent estate. The "ifs" are
significant ones.9 The FSA Client Money Rules provide for several
important exceptions to the definition of "Client Money," and the client
itself may agree to terms that exclude the notion of a trust of "Client
Money." If the money cannot be classed as Client Money, then it forms
part of the debtor's general estate and the relevant clients will-on these
grounds-have only personal claims, not proprietary ones.
"Client assets" (usually securities) are assessed in a similar way.
The terms of the prime broker agreement are crucial. At one end of the
spectrum, some agreements clearly provide for the client's retention of
legal or beneficial ownership of the securities. At the other end of the
spectrum, and less happily, other agreements clearly provide for outright
title transfer of client assets to the Lehman Brothers prime broker. In
these latter cases the client has no proprietary claim to its original assets,
but only a (now not very valuable) contractual right to require Lehman
Brothers to account to it for equivalent assets.
Given the explicit terms of these contracts, the conclusions should
come as no surprise to the client. But that is not always the case. The
terminology of "securities lending," for example, is apt to suggest that
the lender retains its property in the lent securities, and is therefore
protected. Often nothing could be further from the truth. Beconwood
Securitiesto was a test case in the Australian Opes Prime collapse. There
the securities "loan" was on terms that "all right, title and interest in [the
securities] will pass absolutely from one Party to the other, free from all
liens, charges, equities and encumbrances, on delivery or redelivery of
the same in accordance with this Agreement."
It was perhaps
unsurprising, therefore, that the protective "lending" label was held
irrelevant given the explicit agreement for an outright transfer.
One further issue merits comment. Sometimes neither statute nor
contract suggests that the client has a proprietary claim, but nevertheless
9. Re Lehman Bros. Int'l (Europe) (in admin.), (2010) E.W.C.A. Civ. 917 (noting
that client money became subjected to the statutory trust on receipt, not on segregation by
the prime broker, so traceable monies that should have been segregated but were not were
held on the statutory trust, and also noting that the clients entitled to share in the
distribution of the client money pool were all those with the relevant claims, not simply
those who had contributed to the pool).
10. Beconwood Securities Pty Ltd. v. ANZ Banking Group, (2008) F.C.A. 594; see
also Provost v. United States, 269 U.S. 443 (1926); but see, Re Lift Capital Partners Pty
Ltd. v. Merrill Lynch Int'l, (2009) N.S.W.S.C. 7. These cases and related issues are
discussed in more detail in Worthington, supra note 8.
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the client can identify monies (or other assets) that it has paid over to the
broker under the terms of the brokerage agreement. Can the client have
"its" original assets back, in effect waiving the Lehman Brothers'
performance obligations in exchange for return of its own initial
contractually agreed input? This can sometimes amount to a nice legal
question, especially where brokers themselves voluntarily elect to hold
client monies (or other assets) in segregated accounts, perhaps to provide
alternative protection for a client's position, but generally there is little
chance of success with such claims: see, for example, Re Goldcorp
Exchange (in rec)" and a myriad of similar cases arising in different
factual contexts, although also see Re Global Trader Europe Ltd (in

liq).12
Even that is not the end of the matter. Two practical questions
follow the initial doctrinal analysis that the client has a property right.
The first is whether the client's property can still be identified. If clients
cannot point to particular assets as theirs, then no amount of preliminary
doctrinal analysis will deliver the benefits of insolvency protection that
are being sought. And, secondly, even if clients can point to particular
assets as theirs, it is still necessary to ask whether there are any
impediments to getting it back. Sometimes there are. Competing claims
provide one common example of a legal impediment to recovery. 3
In short, any successful proprietary claim depends upon the
identification of particular assets that can legitimately be described as
"the client's," and not "the broker's." It is not enough to show that the
broker's pool of assets has somehow been enhanced by the injection of
certain now non-identifiable client assets.14
Perhaps the public policy input at this stage lies precisely in not
interfering, not for example insisting on a mechanism that treats all
creditors in precisely the same way. The usual justification for noninterference, even when the outcomes seem unfair, is that it eliminates
the risk of tactical use of the insolvency legislation by disaffected
creditors. If creditors' rights are unaltered by insolvency, then there is no
incentive to destroy viable businesses by tipping faltering debtors into
early and unwarranted insolvency. The rule thus avoids economic waste,
however fortuitously advantageous (or otherwise) that prohibition turns
out to be for the individual creditors concerned.

Re Goldcorp Exchange (in rec) (1995) 1 A.C. 74 (P.C.).
12. Re Global Trader Europe Ltd (in liq) (2009) E.W.H.C. 602 (Ch.),
11.

108-111.

13. See, e.g. CMG Equity Investments Pty Ltd v. Australia and New Zealand
Banking Group Ltd. [2008] F.C.A. 455; Phisci Pty Ltd v. Green Frog Nominees Pty Ltd.
[2008] F.C.A. 638.
14. Global Trader Europe Ltd (In Liquidation), Re [2009] EWHC 602 (Ch.), T 91.
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Similar difficult doctrinal and policy issues surround the use of
security, yet here too the assessment of whether there is a security
interest, and its proper characterisation, all follow a strict doctrinal
analysis, eschewing policy input. Yet the policy issues are close to the
surface. A debtor cannot simply agree that a particular creditor's claim
will be preferred on the debtor's insolvency. 5 To do so would clearly
offend the policy of equal sharing of losses, or pari passu distribution to
creditors. This commitment to equal loss-sharing is so strong that
contractual set-off between the debtor and creditor is inoperative on
insolvency if it goes beyond the statutory insolvency set-off rules. On
the other hand, a debtor is free to agree that his creditor's claim will be
preferred to the extent of some security interest granted to the creditor.
The policy that prevents one strategy but allows the other is often seen as
controversial.
More generally, security is controversial because it permits
powerful creditors to protect themselves in a way that works to the
double disadvantage of the remaining unsecured creditors: there is a
disproportionately depleted pool of assets remaining for distribution. For
example, a floating charge over the whole of the debtor's assets and
undertakings would, if left untrammelled, give the secured creditor
absolute priority to the whole of the pool of assets available for
distribution on insolvency. On the plus side, of course, it is well
recognised that security assists commercial activity; debtors can obtain
credit that would not otherwise be available to them, and can do so with
a minimum of transaction costs.
The point to note is the stage at which any public policy argument
rears its head. The advantages and disadvantages of the creditors'
various possible proprietary interests are consciously weighed in the
balance by the legislature, not by the judges-or at least not now, in the
C21st; they may have been more interventionist when these proprietary
rights were being invented. The judges confine themselves, almost
without exception, to applying the statute, or applying common law
doctrinal rules to determine questions about creditors' property interests.
COMMON LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
With all this downplaying of public policy, it comes as some
surprise, therefore, to find what is sometimes (perhaps unfairly)
described as a radically different approach in the application of the
common law anti-deprivation rule. The rule can be expressed simply;
indeed, its C19th formulation remains apt: "there cannot be a valid
15. British Eagle International Airlines Ltd. V. Compagnie Nationale Air France,
[1975] 1 W.L.R. 758 (H.L.).
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contract that a man's property shall remain his until his bankruptcy, and
on the happening of that event shall go over to someone else, and be
taken away from his creditors."'
That is the UK version. The US
version, the ipso facto rule, is enshrined in statute.' 7 A contractual
arrangement which infringes the rule is void. Avoidance will increase
the asset pool available for distribution to the debtor's general creditors.
Conversely, if the rule is not infringed, the agreement will operate
according to its terms and deliver the intended insolvency advantage to
the nominated party.
The rule has been applied by courts since at least the eighteenth
century. On its face it looks uncontentious, yet the line between what is
permitted and what is not remains surprisingly unclear. Lord Neuberger
made this plain in both Perpetual Trustee and Money Markets.1' The
only House of Lords authority is British Eagle.'9
For present purposes, the proper workings of the rule are not the
central issue. 20 The focus here is its reliance on public policy inputs.
The common law anti-deprivation rule is routinely justified on the
grounds of public policy, empowering the courts to strike down
arrangements where parties seek to contract out of,21 or evade,22 or

16. Re Harrison Ex p. Jay (1880) 14 L.R. Ch. D. 19 (hereinafter Jay), 26 (Cotton
LJ), (citing Lord Neuberger, Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services
Ltd [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1160, [2010] Ch 347 (CA) [hereinafter PerpetualTrustee (CA)],
1 1). The cases relied on in Perpetual Trustee (CA) and referred to later in this discussion
include Whitmore v Mason (1861) 2 J&H 204 [hereinafter Whitmore]; Jeavons Ex p.
Mackay, re (1873) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 643 [hereinafter Mackay]; Garrud Ex p. Newitt, re
(1880) 16 Ch. D. 522 [hereineafter Newitt]; British Eagle International Airlines Ltd. v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France [1975] 1 W.L.R. 758 (HL) [hereinafter British Eagle];
Carreras Rothmans Ltd. v. Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd. [1985] Ch. 207 (Ch.D.)
[hereinafter Carreras];Money Markets International Stockbrokers Ltd. (in liquidation) v.
London Stock Exchange Ltd. and another [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1150 [hereinafter Money
Markets]; International Air Transport Association v. Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd.
[2008] H.C.A. 3 (Aust. H. Ct.) [hereinafter Ansett]; see also Mayhew v. King [2010]
EWHC 1121 (Ch) [hereinafter Mayhew].
17. See the analysis of the statutory rule in In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 442
B.R. 407,411 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
18. See Perpetual Trustee (CA), supra note 16, T$ 32, 57, 93; and Money Markets,
supra note 16,
87, 117.
19. British Eagle, supra note 16.
20. See Sarah Worthington, Insolvency Deprivation, Public Policy and Priority Flip
Clauses, 7(1) INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE RESCUE 28-39 (2010); Sarah Worthington,
Making Sense of Arguments about the Anti-Deprivation Rule, 8(1) INT'L CORP. RESCUE
26-39(2011).
21. PerpetualTrustee (CA), supra note 16, % 50, 54, 73 (citing British Eagle, supra
note 16) (both Lords Cross and Morris), Carreras,supra note 16, and Ansett, supra note
16; see also PerpetualTrustee (CA), supra note 16, % 113, 118, 123.
22. Mackay, supra note 16, at 647; British Eagle, supra note 16, at 770 (citing Lord
Morris (dissenting on the outcome, but not on the principle)).
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defeat,23 or work a fraud on, 24 the insolvency legislation. The modem
(and perhaps also the historical) view is that the rule simply prevents
parties from contracting out of the insolvency legislation.25 It targets
arrangements which seek to implement either a different distribution of
the insolvent's assets from that which would obtain under the legislative
rules, or which seek to reduce the pool of assets available for
distribution. In shorthand, these different limbs of the anti-deprivation
rule can be labelled "the contracting out rule" and "the insolvencytriggered deprivation rule."
The global financial crisis has led to a number of corporate
collapses: Perpetual Trustee is not the only modem case to raise the
anti-deprivation issue, nor is it the most recent. However it is, to date,
the only case to have reached the UK court of Appeal, and serves as a
working illustration here.
In Perpetual Trustee,2 6 the Court of Appeal was asked to strike
down a priority flip clause which switched the priority enjoyed over
collateral away from a Lehman Brothers credit default swaps
counterparty and in favour of third party noteholders (including
Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd) in defined circumstances, to the potential
detriment of the now insolvent Lehman Brothers counterparty.27 The
administrators argued that the priority flip clause breached the "antideprivation rule" and was therefore void on the grounds of public policy.
The Court of Appeal found against the administrators and in favour of
the third parties, affirming the judgment of Sir Andrew Morritt, the
Chancellor, in the High Court.
In the US Bankruptcy Court, Justice Peck applied the analogous US
statutory ipso facto rule, perhaps rather more expansively than might
have been predicted, and concluded that the priority flip clause offended
the rule and was therefore void as a fraud on the creditors. 28 Both cases
were due to go on appeal, but Perpetual Trustee has now settled its
claims in both jurisdictions.2 9 The legal issues are clearly important,
23. Whitmore, supranote 16, at 215; British Eagle, note 16, at 770 (Lord Morris).
24. Perpetual Trustee (CA), supra note 16, 1152 (Patten LJ).
25. Id. 154 (Lord Neuberger).
26. Id.
27. Id.; see also Butters v. BBC Worldwide Ltd., [20091 EWHC 1954. (The court
also addressed the treatment of so-called "unwind costs" between these parties, and
determined the outcome of a related appeal which raised the anti-deprivation rule.)
28. In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 442 B.R. 407, 411 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2010).
29. In the UK Court of Appeal, two Noteholders were pursuing claims, Perpetual
Trustee and Belmont. The Perpetual Trustee claims have been settled, but the Belmont
claims remain scheduled for appeal to the Supreme Court in March 2011, see The
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/current-cases/
Details,
Court--Case
Supreme
CCCaseDetails/case_2009 0222.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).
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given the potential application of the same rule to other structured
finance and securitisation deals and the value of the assets in dispute.30
In the UK Court of Appeal, in upholding the flip clause, the Master
of the Rolls, Lord Neuberger, (with whom Longmore LJ agreed3 1 )
explained his conclusions as follows:
Patten LJ has reached the same conclusion on the simple basis that
the "flip," that is, the reversal of the order of priority against a
company as the holder of a charge, in favour of another chargee over
the same assets, cannot be caught by the rule, even if it operates after
the liquidation of the company, at least if such a reversal was an
original feature of the company's charge when it was granted. I have
considerable sympathy with that view, which has the merit of
simplicity.... Further, it is fair to say that the principle of party
autonomy[ 32] . . . supports his view.

However, while that view may well indeed be right, I prefer to rest
my conclusion in this case on the more limited ground that, in
addition to the facts relied on by Patten LJ, the assets over which the
charge exists were acquired with money provided by the chargee in
whose favour the "flip" operates, and that the "flip" was included
merely to ensure, as far as possible, that that chargee is repaid out of
those assets all that he provided (together with interest), before the
company receives any money from those assets pursuant to its
charge. It seems to me that there may be room for argument that, in
the absence of these additional facts, the arrangement in this case
would have fallen foul of the [anti-deprivation rule]. . . . There is

also a danger that the simple analysis adopted by Patten LJ could, in
the light of the very limited circumstances in which the court will
hold a transaction to be a sham, make it very easy to dress up sale
transactions in such a way as to enable the rule to be circumvented. 33
Not only did the Court of Appeal conclude, unanimously, that the antideprivation rule had not been breached; it also expressed hesitation in
applying the rule at all 34 and a concern not to extend its operation any
30. In the Lehman Brothers insolvency, billions of dollars are said to ride on the
outcome of the anti-deprivation litigation: see, e.g., the Decision and Order of the United
States District Court, Southern District of New York, Granting BNY Corporate Trustee
Services Limited's Motion for Leave to Appeal (against the decision of Peck J), handed
down on 20 September 2010, copy on file with authors (see p 15).
31. Perpetual Trustee (CA), supra note 16, 199.
32. Which Lord Neuberger also favoured as a reason for upholding the contractual
provision: see PerpetualTrustee (CA), supra note 16, 158.

33. Perpetual Trustee (CA), supra note 16, T$ 66-67. The reasoning is careful, but
the analysis is difficult to defend. See supra note 20.
34. Id.
171-172. See also id. $T 54, 113, 123. Seemingly confining intervention
to "contracting out" provisions. But cf id. T 32 et seq., 152 et seq., 91 et seq.
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further. 35 Equally, in the Ansett litigation in Australia, the majority was
clearly reluctant to reach a conclusion that might upset the commercially
successful and internationally beneficial IATA clearing house scheme.3 6
Other modern cases are similarly cautious.
Certain commentators go further still, suggesting that the rule has
no application in a modem insolvency regime: their argument is that the
Insolvency Act 1986 ("IA") provides a comprehensive code, and should
not be supplemented by the common law or by public policy
interventions from judges.
This approach, denying the force of the common law rule,
especially because it is based on public policy consideration, seems both
A significant number of judicial
flawed and counterproductive.
precedents support the application of the rule, including British Eagle37
in the House of Lords. No anti-deprivation case, even the modern ones,
has suggested that the rule itself no longer exists; the debate is only ever
as to whether the rule applies on the facts. Indeed, the anti-deprivation
rule has a long history which was presumably familiar to the framers of
the IA 1986 and its predecessors, and was reinforced by the particular
statutory approach to protective trusts which implicitly assumes the
existence of a common law anti-deprivation rule.38 Finally, judicial
intervention which simply outlaws contractual evasion of the statutory
insolvency distribution regime (and in particular contractual evasion that
purports to prefer the contracting parties and effect a deprivation on the
non-contracting parties) is surely not especially controversial. Perpetual
Trustee itself recognised this.39
Yet another line of argument against the common law antideprivation rule suggests that contracts should be enforced according to
their terms, especially contracts agreed by sophisticated parties with the
benefit of legal advice. 4 0 This effectively pits one public policy principle
against another, and suggests that the principle of freedom of contract
and party autonomy should win out against the principle of collective
insolvency management. The reasons are not given.
This argument for freedom of contract was advanced in the recent
case of Mayhew,4 1 where a settlement agreement provided that a
promised indemnity would terminate if the indemnified party became
35.
36.
notion
should
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. 1 57.
See, e.g. supra note 16, 1 76-79. In this respect, the hesitancy also related to the
that carefully negotiated contractual arrangements between sophisticated parties
be given their full effect.
Supra note 16.
The Trustee Act, 1925, c. 19, § 33 (UK).
Supra note 16, %132 et. seq, 152 et. seq.
91, 99.
See, e.g., id. 58; see also id.
Mayhew v. King [2010] EWHC 1121.
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insolvent. Sir Edward Evans-Lombe refused to accept the supremacy-ofcontract argument, responding that, as a matter of policy, such an
approach would enable routine avoidance of the anti-deprivation rule in
almost every imaginable case; and, as a matter of precedent, the
proposition ran contrary to both modem and older authorities.
But even this does not put the case strongly enough. The principle
of freedom of contract might justify a pro-party approach to the
interpretation of bilateral arrangements.
But the same pro-party
approach is quite inappropriate when the arrangement affects the rights
of non-contracting third parties. However much the contracting parties
wish it, a bilateral arrangement cannot deprive innocent third parties of
their legitimate statutory rights:42 freedom of contract cannot trump the
collective management rules enshrined in the insolvency legislation-the
only freedom that exists is the freedom of contract within the law.
Looking back at all this detail, what conclusions might be extracted
about the role of public policy in the collective management of
insolvency? On one view, the role of public policy is steadily
diminishing. Historically, there must have been substantial public policy
intervention from the courts in order to develop all the different
proprietary interests that are now so crucial in determining the proper
distribution of the insolvent debtor's assets. The development was slow,
it is true, so no one case marks out a paradigm shift in legal thinking, but
the net result is nonetheless dramatic. And yet the analysis in this
domain now appears to be based on strict doctrinal analysis without even
a nod to public policy. Equally, but less radically, the judges centuries
ago must have developed and refined the common law anti-deprivation
rule. It still appears to meet a need,43 and judges (as distinct from
counsel) do not question its existence, although their mood is clearly to
limit its modem operation as much as possible. Finally, and by contrast,
the statutory insolvency rules are roundly embraced; their clear public
policy motivation comes from parliament, however, not the courts.
All of this raises very directly the obvious question-what role
should public policy play in modem judicial activity? Is it proper to
allow judicial resort to public policy? More fundamentally, is resort to
public policy the best-or the worst-way to deliver a modem, effective
and globally competitive commercial law regime?

42. A similar argument emerged in the litigation of Spectrum Plus Ltd (In
Liquidation), Re [2005] UKHL 41, but there too the House of Lords refused to favour the
clear intention of the contracting parties in the face of the disadvantage that would
thereby be wreaked on non-contracting creditors seeking their due protection under the
IA 1986.
43. See supra note 20.
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JUDGES AND PUBLIC POLICY

The debate about whether judges allow their decisions to be
influenced by public policy is essentially a debate about judicial
lawmaking. At one extreme, judges are conceded to be legitimately
making the law; at the other, they merely administer it, and should
therefore confine their deliberations to a rigorous doctrinal analysis of
the relevant statutes or common law precedents.
Between these two positions, the attitude of the English courts to
any explicit engagement with issues of public policy has ebbed and
flowed. Outright hostility is not uncommon. Mr. Justice Burrough
famously remarked in Richardson v Mellish that public policy is a "very
unruly horse and when once you get astride it, you never know where it
will carry you," adding that an argument founded on public policy "leads
you from sound law, and is never argued but when all other points fail."44
Even in those early days, it seems, the King's Courts understood
something of the administrative/legislative power division behind the
divine right of kings, the precursor to the more modem principle of
parliamentary sovereignty.45
And yet it is also conceded that judge-made law is precisely the
distinguishing feature of the common law. It is what sets it apart from
civil law. Without judicial lawmaking, the common law could not have
developed. Beyond public policy it is difficult to imagine what other
basis might have guided common law judges in their task. So it is
perhaps predictable-indeed more than predictable-that, as well as
judicial assertions against the role of public policy, there are often even
stronger claims in its favour. In Egerton v Brownlow, for example, Lord
Chief Baron Pollock described the long history of public policy
intervention in this way: 46
This doctrine of the public good or the public safety, or what is
sometimes called "public policy," being the foundation of law, is
supported by decisions in every branch of the law; and an unlimited
number of cases may be cited as directly and distinctly deciding upon
contracts and covenants as the avowed broad ground of the public
good and on that alone; and the name and authority of nearly all the
great lawyers (whose decisions and opinions have been extensively
reported) will be found associated with this doctrine in some shape or

44. Richardson v Mellish (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294. 304 (H.L.).
45. Anthony Lester, English Judges as Law Makers, 1993 PuB. L. 269, 270 (1993)
(traces this perspective back to the King's Court and concludes that "a monarchical view
continues to shape the modem British constitution. The divine right of kings has been
replaced by the divine right of the Crown in Parliament.")
46. Egerton v Brownlow (1853) 10 Eng. Rep. 359, 418 (H.L).
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other. It is distinctly laid down by Coke (66 a), "nihil quod est
inconveniens est licitum."
Both the pro- and anti-public policy camps must inevitably come
together on some matters. At the least controversial end of the scale,
both camps will generally concede that there is necessary and inevitable
judicial resort to public policy whenever courts are required to apply
notional "public standards" in legal tests of "reasonableness," or
"unconscionability," or "good faith," or "arbitrariness." In all these
determinations, individual views will frequently differ, and judges cannot
be allowed simply to give vent to their own personal biases; they are
charged with acting in accordance with public norms. To that extent,
public policy becomes an essential element in the exercise of judicial
discretion.
But judicial lawmaking often goes well beyond these simple
standard-setting exercises that are an inevitable part of judicial decisionmaking. A conscious resort to arguments from public policy was largely
responsible for delivering the sophistication, subtlety, fleetness and
dynamism that make the common law (including equity) so attractive
internationally. In Davies v Davies, which is a leading early restraint-oftrade decision, it was "considered public policy to assist England to
become a nation of traders."4 7 In Donoghue v Stevenson, the "neighbour
principle" was enunciated for the first time on the basis that there is a
"general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender
must pay.A8 There is no shortage of similar examples: consider the
judicially-inspired developments in the field of trusts, fixed and floating
charges, assignment of choses in action, interference with contractual
rights, equitable relief in cases of mistake or accident, and the rules on
frustration and failure of consideration. This list is almost endless.
At times, of course, these judicial efforts were seen to overstep the
mark. Then they were reined in, either by the House of Lords (or, now,
the Supreme Court) or by parliament. Lord Denning's term as Master of
the Rolls in the 1970s is often seen as the high water mark in this regard.
His promotion of the "deserted wives' equity" in National Provincial
Bank v Ainsworth49 was promptly overruled by the House of Lords,so
although later re-enacted in the Matrimonial Homes Act 1976. His new
model constructive trust in Eves v Eves5 1 has not been adopted in
subsequent cases, and his early views on equitable mistake are now

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Davies v Davies (1887) 36 Ch. D 359, 365.
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562, 580.
National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth [1964] Ch. 665.
[1965] A.C. 1175.
Eves v Eves [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1338, 1341.
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doubted.5 2 But his wins far outweigh his losses, and a number of his
public policy interventions have stood the test of time: as a result of his
judgments, the common law now includes rules on promissory
estoppel;5 3 tort liability for negligent misstatement;5 4 freezing injunctions
(Mareva injunctions) 55 and search orders (Anton Piller orders);56 and of
course judicial recognition of the public interest in cricket.
The march has continued. Consider the more recent judicial
developments in the law relating to undue influence,58 unjust
enrichment,59 contract damages,60 or trusts.61
Sometimes the judges downplay their inventiveness; Mr. Justice
Neuberger (as he then was) in Murphy v Murphy described his role as
refining rather than inventing a new area of law: 6 2
In so far as this case involves (as I accept that it does) extending the
principle identified in A. v. C., I think that it is perhaps more a case of
an existing child developing rather than a new child being bom.
But even if this is the case-and the line appears difficult to drawthen the distinction seems to do no more than reflect the truth that the
common law and equity proceed incrementally, building up from real
examples, until eventually a general principle emerges. In this way, as
Lord Neuberger recognised, the cases demonstrate that the law (although
Lord Neuberger's focus was equity alone) "continues, when necessary,
to develop, to extend."613
Whether this judicial lawmaking role is an appropriate one is a
different question, of course. Going back over three centuries, there have
been endless clashes between the views of contemporaries. Sir Owen
52. Solle v Butcher [1950] 1 KB 671. Now see Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris
Salvage (International) Ltd [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1407, [2003] QB 679.
53. Central London Prop. Trust Ltd v. High Trees House Ltd., (1947) K.B. 130
(C.A.).
54. Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., (1951) 2 K.B. 164 (adopted by the House of
Lords in Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., (1964) A.C. 465).
55. Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis, (1975) 1 W.L.R. 1093 (C.A.); Mareva
Compania Naveiera SA v. Int'l Bulkcarriers SA, (1980) 1 All E.R. 213 (C.A.).
56. Anton Piller KG v. Mfg. Processes Ltd. & Others, (1976) Ch. 55 (C.A.).
57. Miller v. Jackson, (1977) Q.B. 966.
58. Nat'1 Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Morgan, (1985) A.C. 686; Barclays Bank PLC v.
O'Brien, (1994) 1 A.C. 180; Royal Bank of Scotland v. Etridge, (2002) 2 A.C. 773.
59. Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd., (1988) UKHL 12, (1991) 2 A.C. 548;
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington LBC, (1996) A.C. 669.
60. Attorney Gen. v. Blake, (2001) 1 A.C. 268.
61. Murphy v. Murphy, (1999) 1 W.L.R 282.
62. Id. at 291.
63. Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, Master of the Rolls, Has Equity Had its Day?,
Lecture at Hong Kong University Common Law Lecture 2010 (Oct. 12, 2010) (transcript
available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/media/speeches/2010/mr-speech-hong-konglecture-12102010).

2011]

STATUTORY RULES, COMMON LAW RULES AND PUBLIC POLICY

629

Dixon and Lord Reid, for example, readily illustrate opposing schools of
thought on judicial activism. Sir Owen Dixon, writing in 1965, asserted
that judicial method should employ "strict logic and high technique," and
that a judge's decisions should not be subjective or based on political or
sociological propensities.6" By contrast, Lord Reid, writing in the early
1970s, roundly dismissed the declaratory theory of common law as a
fairytale65 and promoted the importance of common sense and public
policy as elements of the judicial armoury, along with legal principle.66
While legal opinion and rigorous jurisprudence find support in each
of these two schools, the majority, and probably all civil lawyers, think
of the common law quite simply as judge-made law.' Lord Goff said that
"case law is independent of statute, of itself a source of law," 67 and Sir
George Baker P adopted and promoted Lord Reid's views (outlined
above), suggesting that, "in the search for a middle way between
certainty and justice, judges must prevent precedent becoming master,
and with this in view a court should have regard to common sense, legal
principle and public policy in that order." 68
This same approach to judicial lawmaking is also supported by the
overwhelming body of academic and extra-judicial commentary.
Michael Lavarach, writing in the Australian context, argues that
"[p]roposals to return the court to a non-policy role of mere
interpretation of laws belong in the realms of legal fiction." 6 9 And Sir
Gerard Brennan says that "[i]n today's changing world, the courts would
forfeit their integrity if they failed to exercise their legitimate jurisdiction
to declare the general law in terms which ... accord with the enduring
values of our society."70 In the same vein, Justice Williams goes so far
as to suggest that "[p]ublic policy is the backbone of the common law."71

64. Sir Owen Dixon, ConcerningJudicialMethod, 29 AUSTL. L.J. 468 (1956).
65. Lord Reid, The Judge as Law Maker, 12 JSPTL NS 22, 22 (1972).
66. Id. at 25; see also infra note 68.
67. Lord Goff, The Future of the Common Law, ICLQ 745, 749 (1997).
68. Smethurst v. Smethurst, (1977) 3 W.L.R. 472, (1978) Fan 52, 54. For Lord
Reid's speech itself, see "The Judge as Law Maker" (1972) 12 JSPTL NS 22, 25.
69. Michael Lavarch, How the High Court Considers Policy, 1 AUSTL. J. ADMIN. 57
(1998); see also James Hopkins, Fictionsand the JudicialProcess:A PreliminaryTheory
of Decision, 33 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1966); see also R. Brachtenbach, Public Policy and
JudicialDecisions,21 GoNz. L. REV. 1 (1985-1986); see also R. Silbeman Abella, Public
Policy and the JudicialRole, 34 McGILL L.J. 1021 (1988-1989).

70. GF Brennan, Principal Issues Confronting Different Courts of Final Jurisdiction
on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century, Speech at the Mason Court and Beyond
Conference (Sept. 8-10 1995) (transcript available at http://www.hcourt.gov.aul
publications/speeches/former/speeches-by-the-hon-sir-gerard-brennan).
71. G.N. Williams, Importance of public policy considerations in judicial decisionmaking, 25(4) INT'L LEGAL PRACTITIONER 134 (2000).
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The real debate, however, is put rather more sharply by a number of
C21st extra-judicial comments. Lord Neuberger suggests that, in the
UK, the capacity for judicial lawmaking is both necessary and beneficial
because Parliament has provided too much ill-thought-out legislation in
some areas, and has consistently failed to legislate in other arenas which
are both controversial and sensitive. In both these situations, he argues,
judges have to go further than mere interpretation of legislation and
reliance on precedents if they are to deliver sensible results.72 By
contrast, Sir Hary Gibbs (who served on the Australian High Court) was
far more reserved: 73
It is sometimes argued that one justification for judicial activism is
that the legislature is uninterested in reforming the law and that the
judges should therefore assume that task. It has been said that since
the legislatures have failed to keep the law in a serviceable state, "the
courts have been left with a substantial part of the responsibility for
keeping the law in a serviceable state, a function which calls for the
consideration of the contemporary values of the community." 74 Lord
Reid answered the argument that it is the task of the judges to do
what the legislature should have done, but failed to do, by saying that
"where Parliament has feared to tread it is not for the courts to rush
in." To say that the courts have that role is to confound the
distinction between legislative and judicial functions, and in that
respect is contrary to constitutional principle. Also the suggestion
that the court should formulate a new rule in the light of
contemporary values is open to the objection that there is usually a
diversity of opinion as to what those values are....
This latter position has a clear ideological basis in the separation of
powers and appeals to many in terms of democracy and the rule of law.
Lord Evershed noted how the House of Lords (in its judicial capacity)
had more than once "emphasised that judicial legislation is apt to be a
dangerous usurpation of Parliamentary functions."7 It also appeals to
many on the basis of certainty and predictability, since public policy
considerations are not uniform, and judicial assessment of them is likely
to be subjective.

72. See Lord Neuberger, supra note 63, 1j 27.
73.

Sir Harry Gibbs, Judicial Activism And Judicial Restraint: Where Does The

Balance Lie?, Speech at Constitutional Law Conference, UNSW (Feb. 20, 2004)
(transcript available
at www.gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/sites/gteentre.unsw.edu.. ./59
HarryGibbs.doc); see also G. Lindell, 'Judge & Co.': Judicial Law-Making and the
Mason Court, 5 AGENDA 83-96 (1998).
74. Dietrich v. the Queen, (1992) 177 C.L.R. 292, 329.
75. Lord Evershed, Equity is not to be presumed to be past the age of child-bearing,
I SYDNEY L. REv. 1, 7 (1953).
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But arguments about the role of public policy intervention are not
confined to this theoretical high-ground. The public policy questions
raised by the anti-deprivation rule (which was in issue in the Perpetual
Trustee7 6 litigation) can be addressed at this high level of theory, and
probably were in the Cl8th when the rule was in its early stages of
development. But its modem antagonists need not run their arguments
quite so widely. For many, the issue is much narrower: where parliament
has legislated to provide a comprehensive national insolvency regime,
they suggest there is no room for the operation of a public policy rule
injected via common law judicial intervention. In other words, where
parliament has spoken, public policy interventions should implicitly be
prohibited.
This question reflects the reality that the common law is changing.
As Parliament legislates more frequently, and the volume of case law
grows, there are fewer gaps that need to be filled, and when these gaps
do arise, there is less reason why the judges rather than Parliament
should act to fill them. As Lord Neuberger notes:7
It was acceptable for the court to invent new Common Law and
Equitable rights, remedies and principles in earlier times, when
Parliament sat infrequently and for short periods, and when England
had not yet moved from monarchy to democracy. In such earlier
times there was less of a clear dividing line between the various
branches of the state: separation of powers had not yet crossed the
mind of either John Locke or Montesquieu. In the 1770s, the Lord
Chief Justice was a member of the Cabinet.
Indeed, reduced judicial activity may even align better with many
parties' commercial objectives. In the short term at least, reduced
opportunity for judicial interference will leave commercial parties free to
arrange their affairs as they wish; and yet if things do go wrong,
decreased flexibility in the judicial role may ensure greater certainty
from the courts in the decisions which they deliver.
And yet ... is this really the ideal? Will it deliver the type of legal
regime that is needed for an effective, functioning modem global
democracy?
Party autonomy and legal certainty are undoubtedly attractive, but a
short pause for thought about national legal developments over the past
century shows how often the needs of the parties are delivered more
76. See PerpetualTrustee (CA), supra note 16.
77. See Lord Neuberger, supra note 63, 40; see also P.H. Winfield, Public Policy
in English Common Law, 42 HARv. L. REv. 76, 85 (1928-1929) ("Case-law and statute
between them were rapidly reducing to certainty what had been under the vague control
of reason, convenience and policy").
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rapidly, in a more context-sensitive manner, and more nimbly by
incremental changes in the common law than by ad hoc statutory
interventions, or by decade-long consultations on major statutory
reforms.
Of course there is enormous value in improved legislation and
legislative practices. Without this route, law reform and modernisation
would be ad hoc, piecemeal and lacking any overarching objective focus.
Legislation also has the twin advantages of being motivated by general
need, not particular litigants, and delivering its rules by way of succinct
principles or clear demands. In a broadly similar way, international
conventions, model laws, and legislative guides can provide the means
for more rapid and considered global solutions promoting the
harmonization and modernization of commercial practices. These "legal
technologies" operate supra-nationally, often through the work of bodies
such the United Nation Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL").
Yet even the very best parliamentary legislation or international
convention will fail if it is not administered with a hefty dose of
analytical rigour and careful judgement-common sense, legal principle
and public policy as Lord Reid put it.78 This is because no legislator can
possibly anticipate all the eventualities, and even if it could, the resulting
detail would make the whole legislative enterprise unworkable. More
than that, in any package of rules, it is inevitable that some of our most
fundamental goals for society will be in direct conflict. Consider the
tension between freedom and equality: the more freedom there is, the
less equality, and vice versa. If the law supports one goal it loses the
other. So when these two goals are in conflict, what is to be done-how
is the balance to be played out?
It is impossible to deal with these problems, whether legislative or
founded in judicial precedent, unless judges are trusted to exercise
discretion. And since their discretion cannot simply be a matter of
personal preference, it has of necessity to adopt public policy
preferences.
If this is not done, then-pragmatically-we will be left without
workable avenues for the delivery of adjustments and modifications to
the legal regime. How else, in this climate of codification and increased
legislation, and in an environment that is increasingly subject to
European, global and comparative influences can a commercially
competitive system be served? Are there other alternatives to the judicial
policy approach that work better? What is the best mechanism for
lawmaking that is attuned to public policy goals?
78.

See Lord Reid, supra note 65, at 25.
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CONCLUSION
The allure of the law as an antidote to social ills is powerful.
However, any legal system has to be judged by its functionality. In the
words of Lord Denning: 79
the law .. . has two great objects: to preserve order and to do justice;
and the two do not always coincide. Those whose training lies
towards order, put certainty before justice; whereas those whose
training lies towards the redress of grievances, put justice before
certainty. The right solution lies in keeping a proper balance between
the two.
In a perfect world, the law would be clear, certain and
comprehensible. The reality is some way from this. However the better
the courts become at delivering the desirable goal of certainty in the law,
the less they are able to keep pace with the speed and need for
differentiation in modem social and commercial developments, so the
less well they serve the real demands of the community they exist to
support. If the common law is to continue to survive and prosper, it
needs a mechanism for ensuring flexibility, responsiveness, subtlety and
differentiation in the law. How is this flexibility built in, and especially
how is it built in by an unelected and unrepresentative minority sitting on
the bench in a court of law? If the courts cannot perform this function,
then it is necessarily left to the legislature, and almost everywhere the
consensus seems to be that this is too slow, too political and too
generalised.
This is a difficult issue. Here it is suggested that the goals can be
delivered only if judges are trusted to take some decisions with an eye to
public policy. This option has its risks, of course, but they seem
preferable to an alternative which seems likely to neuter the common
law's evolutionary and adaptive power, and lead inexorably to the
stultification of the entire common law regime.
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